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This research was conducted with a view to explore the
oppotunities that are open to foreign banks in China; and how
these opportunities have influenced the banks in Hong Kong. In-
depth interviews with local bankers experienced in the China
business were revelatory concerning about the prospects in the
potential market as well as the related operations of their own
banks.
In terms of prospect, trade financing and project financing
are the major areas of attention. In addition, direct banking
activities allowed to the future foreign branches also receives
wide interest. Equipment leasing, loan syndication, insurance
and merchant banking are other businesses with sizable potential.
Banks in Hong Kong, locallly incorporated or branches of
foreign banks have anticipated imminent competition as the market
in china continues to develop. Their competitiveness will fade
if these foreign banks are confident enough to set up direct
operations in China. However, local bankers are very optimistic
about the development. It will take time for china to catch up
with the technology and experience in order to compete with Hong
Kong as an important financial centre. No place in China can be
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Since its adoption of more decentralized and daring
policies which are highlighted by the opening up of the four
special economic zones, the 14 coastal cities and part of the
Hainan Dao to foreign investments (please see Appendix One),
China has immediately become a very conspicuous potential market
for nearly any kind of business.
This expansion in trade and investment has resulted in more
and more capital manoeuvres and financial acitivities. As trade
and investment grow the financial activities concerning the
People's Republic of China become more vibrant.
Meanwhile the projection that PRC may need huge capital to
finance its modernization programes allows the PRC to be a huge
potential market to the foreign banks, especially those which
have already reached their exposure limit in other parts of the
world.
As the third financial centre in the world, Hong Kong
undoubtedly can sense the immense opportunities which are lying
merely across the border. On the other hand it can also foresee
that competitors from all over the world will not make it an easy
task to dominate in the China market. In fact, it is very pre-
mature to talk about market domination at this infant stage. As
one of the interviewed banker has put it, 'There is no late comer
in the China market. The country is so vast and the needs so
varied that any one bank can find its own niche.'
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Objective of the Study
The objective of this study is two- fold. Firstly, it is
conducted with a view to explore the existing and potential
opportunities in the People's Republic of China due to the recent
political development. Secondly, since this change in the PRC is
so tremendous and Hong Kong is so close to the country, it is
worthwhile to know how the banks in Hong Kong react to this
momentous change. How do they interpret the change? What
strategies, if any, do they use to meet the situations? These
are examples of questions which are to be answered in this study.
At the end of the research, it is hoped that three things
can be accomplished. Firstly, the various business opportunities
and their relative attractiveness in terms of their
permissiveness to the foreign banks would be evaluated.
Secondly, an exposition- on how the banks in Hong Kong have
performed in the China businesses would be attempted using the
information gained in the interviews. Lastly, based on the
former two accomplishments, some recommendations would be
offered. However, the readers must be reminded that the
information in this study only contains events and facts up to
the end of April 1985. Therefore, any major events after then
may have qualification on the conclusions made here.
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Definitions of Entities and Terms
In order to lay out the issues clearly and come up with an
easily perceivable picture of the study it is necessary to
differentiate the diverse entities which would be studied and
mentioned in the report.
The first conspicuous entity is the People's Republic of
China. In particular, the author is interested in events which
took place after 1977. By that time the Cultural Revolution and
the Gang of Four had both come to an end. Only then China began
to move on to a more practical track to modernizing the country.
The Maoist way of forbiding foreign investment was officially
renounced in December 1978 when Li Qiang, then the Minister of
Foreign trade declared in a conference that
China welcomes joint investments with foreign firms whose
equity shares in such ventures may run up to a maximum of
anywhere near 49 percent with the length of such ownership
up to negotiation (1).
In addition to this change of attitude concerning foreign
investments, more open and effective policies have been devised
and implemented.
In the text of this report, 'China' and 'PRC' will be used
interchangingly to refer to this country.
(1) Daily Report- PRC, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Washington, 19 December 1978, pp. Al- A3
4The second term which needs definition is 'foreign bank to
China'. This group nearly emcompasses all the banking
institutions in the world. This term is used to mean any banking
institution which is not owned or managed by the PRC authority.
Thus the term foreign bank is also applicable to, say, the Hong
Kong Shanghai Bank.
On the other hand it takes great pains to define, what
exactly is a bank. Different adjectives preceding the word bank
tell a lot about what the bank actually does in different
contexts or environments. Though different kinds of banks are
restricted to different activities indifferent environments, it
is outside the scope of this paper to distinguish the types of
banks. Moreover, banks can have subsidiaries which can do
business outside a normal bank's scope. For example, a bank can
establish trading house to do commodity trading. Therefore, the
word 'bank' here is a general term which refers to any business
organization which relys on the deployment of monetary funds-
both assets and liabilities- as sole source of income but can
diversify into businesses which can utilize the foundation built
up by the former activity. Therefore, even non-bank activities
like leasing may also be considered as opportunity to the banks
because the latter have the means to benefit.
Meanwhile, the deposit-taking sector in Hong Kong, under
the three-tier structure established since 1981, is made up of
three distinct classes of institutions: lincensed banks, licensed
deposit-taking companies and registered deposit-taking companies.
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However, in the section where the impact on the banks in Hong
Kong is studied only the first group will be considered.
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Methodology
The data collection procedure is divided into two phases.
The first phase is literature study. The data collected in this
phase would cover the policy changes in PRC the current
interests of foreign banks to enter into this potential market
the experts' opinions about the prospects and other relevant
statistics. This information is the starting point to discuss
the opportunities open to foreign banks in China, and serves as
the background to delineate the responses and strategies of the
banks in Hong Kong.
The sources of information in this phase include books,
journal reports, megazine articles and other published media.
The second phase starts later, which is consisted of
in-depth interviews with experienced local bankers. The in-depth
interview. approach is adopted because it is more superior in
soliciting more detailed and in-house information as compared
with other methods like questionnaire survey and telephone
interviews. Moreover, personal rapport gained through actually
seeing each other is facilating is inducing opinions from the
bankers.
At the end of 1984 there were 140 licensed banks in Hong
Kong (1). Among these 140 banks, six groups are differentiated
by their country of incorporation. The objective is to obtain a
sample which can be more representative of the practices and
(1) Hong Kong Annual Report 1985 p. 91
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strategies employed among the banks in response to the China
market.
The six groups are: 1) American banks, 2) British banks, 3)
Chinese (PRC) banks, 4) European banks, 5) Japanese Banks, and 6)
Banks incorporated in Hong Kong. British banks are given a
separate category because their existence in Hong Kong is longer
and the influence greater. A total of 13 banks were contacted and
asked for an in-depth interview (please see Appendix Two). These 13
banks were chosen for their preeminence in their China business
as revealed by the first phase of the study. At least two target
subjects were selected in each group.
In the interviews two categories of questions are
asked (please see Appendix Three). The first one is concerned
about the subject bank's operations and activities related to the
PRC market. The second one is on the interviewees' opinions
about the potential opportunities that appear in the PRC.
In the end, out of the 13 banks contacted, six consented to
be interviewed and proffer information. They are:
Banque Nationale de Paris European bank
American bankCitibank
local bankEast Asia Bank
American BankFirst Chicago Bank
Hong Kong Shanghai Bank local bank
Standard Chartered Bank British bank
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Limitation and Summary
Among the six groups of banks, the Chinese and the Japanese
banks were unwilling to co-orperate even when a follow-up contact
was made. Therefore, the author can only rely on comments from
the other interviewees to understand the operations of the
Japanese and the Chinese banks.
To start with, background information about the development
in the PRC will be given in the following chapter. Chapter Three
will be devoted to analysing the opportunities open to the
foreign banks within the physical boundary of China while chapter
four will talk about the financial acitivities and businesses
that banks may find worthwhile to launch. In Chapter Five
findings from the interviews will be analysed and made sense of
in terms of the impact on the operation of Hong Kong's banks and
the whole report will be suffixed by the conclusions and
recommendations in the last chapter.
9CHAPTER TWO
CHINA- THE AWAKENING DRAGON
To the outside world, China in the Twentith Century was only
a mystical country-filled with cival wars, invasions, political
purges, natural disasters and finally huge amount of sufferers.
Ever since the Communists took over the control, China has
been secluded from the outside world with lttle being known to
outsiders. Several phenomena, however, are obvious to,the China
observers.. The one billion strong population in the country is
the most strnigent problem to tackle. The economy of the country
is stagnant and most of the labour force are under-motivated.
General living standard is low compared with the other developing
countries and more so with the developed western countries.
However, things are changing and hopes are rekindled after the
Cultural Revolution and the submission of the Gang of Four.
Since 1978, besides subpressing the population growth by
vigorous policies, China has started a series of daring economic
policies to modernize the economy of the socialist country.
Important economic policies with conspicuous consequences in
attracting foreign investments include the followings:
1. Creating special economic zones and opening up 14 coastal
cities to accommodate foreign investments:
2. offering incentives like permission to remit profit abroad
so as to attract more foreign investors;
3. Developing a set of-joint venture laws to facilitate the
introduction of foreign capital and technology;
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4. Allowing more flexibility in the rules pertaining to import
of equipment and the deployment of foreign exchange and
5. Delegating more autonomy to production units and regional
governments in the pursuit of modernization.
lne impact of these modernization policies is
incalculatably great in many aspects. Politically it means the
Maoist way is being abandoned and the regime has shifted to the
hands of more liberal party members whose policies make the
country more acceptable to the non-socialist countries. Also,
China is more integrated in the global economy. The country has
really opened itself to the outside world. The following table
shows how international trade in China has been affected since
the turning point at the year 1978.
Table one:
Important Trade Statistics.in China from 1977 to 1984
(in US$million) Change from
Year Export Import Total Trad previous year
1984 24,440 25,530 49,970 22.7%
1983 22,220 18,500 40,720 2.2 (a)
1982 22,348 19,293 41,641 5.4
1981 22,007 22,014 44,021 16.4
1980 18,270 19,550 37,820 28.9
1979 13,660 15,670 29,330 42.1
1978 9,750 10,890 20,640 39.5
1977 7,590 7,210 14,800
Sources: Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 24, 1985
China: Statistics in Brief, State Statistical Bureau,
People's Republic of China
(a) The decline in these two years can be explained by the
tightening up of policies which were considered to be going
too unregulated then.
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There is another indicator which shows that China is gaining
its momentum in its modernization attempt. This indicator also
shows China is a credit worthy nation in the world. Since 1977
China has beening doing well with her exports and has amassed
sizable foreign reserves. These reserves on the one hand act as
the final support to the modernization programs and on the other
hand, as the guarantee to solicit foreign loans and investments
which are so important to the country. Table two shows-China's
foreiqn reserves positions from 1977 to 1984
Table Two:
China's Foreign Reserves From 1977 to 1984
(in US$billion)









Source: IMF International financial Statistics, January 1985
(a) As at the end of October, 1984
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In addition to the healthy amount of foreign reserves, the
credit standing in the world market is extremely good. It's
credit standing has already surpassed that of Hong Kong.
According to the monthly megazine Institutional Investor, Hong
Kong is 22 while China is number 21 (1).
All these rosy attractions have resulted in increasing
amount of foreign investments in the SEZs and the coastal cities.
Accompanying the increasing amount of trade and investments is
the reshaping of the banking and financial systems in the PRC.
One of the policy change is the relaxing and updating of the
regulations pertaining to the establishment of representative
offices in the country, thus facilitating the foreign banks to
plant their interest in the potential market.
On February 1, 1983 China issued its latest provisional
regulations for the establishment of representative offices in
China by overseas Chinese and foreign financial institutions
(please see Appendix Four).
At the end of 1983, 65 foreign banks had already set up
their representative offices in Peking, 13 in Shanghai, 12 in
Canton and one in Xiamen. In addition these banks can set
up subordinate offices in other locations designated. Running a
representative office in Peking costs within the range from
US$250,000 to $500,000 (2) rent and salary being the greatest
(1) Institutional Investor, March 1985
(2) South China Morning Post, April 4, 1985, Business News p. 3
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items of expenditure. However, despite this high cost, the
foreign banks are unhesitant in making the first investments.
The next worth=mentioning change is the permission allowing
foreign banks to handle businesses which were, in the past,
Bank of China's domain. Most prominent of all is the permission
given to the four banks which have their branches in China to
take deposits and make loans in foreign currency. These four
banks are: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Standard
Chartered Bank, Bank of East Asia and Overseas-Chinese Banking
Corporation. They now can now make loans at their own rate and
accept deposits at the same interest rate as the Bank of China-
about one percent (1) besides maintaining the other operations.
(for other businesses permitted please see Appendix Five).
Going one step further, on April 2, 1985 the PRC has
promulgated its 'Regulations Governing foreign Banks and Joint
Chinese-foreign Banks in special economic zones' (please see
Appendix Six). At this present moment, these banking
regulations may only apply to Shenzhen. This liberalization
programme for Shenzhen is a 'pilot project' for a period of two
years. If this project is successful, the scheme will be
extended to the other special economic zones and later to other
cities (2).
At present, there are 13 foreign banks represented in
(1) 'Removing the Fetters', Banking World, February 1985, p.12
(2) South China Morning Post, April 4, 1985, Business News, p.3
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Shenzhen. Nearly of them have applied for a full banking licence
but it has been learned that China only plans to issue about half
a dozen licences.
From this brief account of the relevant banking changes to
the foreign banks, it can be seen that the pace of change is very
rapid. Besides, the degree of competition will be intensified
among the foreign banks in terms of direct banking activities.
15CHAPTER THREE
DIRECT BANKING OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN CHINA
After a review of China's recent developments, it is time to
look at the opportunities brought about by these developments.
In order to make it easy to conceptualize, these opportunities
are categorized into two sorts. The first sort consists of those
activities which are operated directly inside China and regulated
by the Chinese authority. The activities iclude information
gathering and consultation, and ordinary commercial bank
activities.
The next sort is induced by activities which are usually
conducted outside China and with third parties that may be doing
business with the PRC. The procedure and arrangement of these
activities and finacial facilities are not under the jurisdiction
of the Chinese authority. These acitivities include corres-
pondent banking, loan syndication, trade financing, project
financing, leasing, and insurance. They will be elaborated more
in the next chapter.
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Information Gathering and Consultancy- Representative office
Since the modernization movement and the relaxation of the
regulations concerning opening representative offices, banks were
earnest in opening their representative offices in various parts
of China. According to the provisional regulations issued by the
People's Bank of China (please see Appendix Four) representative
offices in China can only operate within the scope of non-profit
activities such as carrying on business negotiations, acting as
liaison, providing consultancy and other services. They shall not
engage in any direct profit-making business activities.
The number of staff allowed and needed is minimal, about
three to four officers only. Usually, the representative
officers are transferred from Hong Kong while some minor staff
may be recruited locally. These people are involved in the
preliminary tasks of starting new businesses. From the very
beginning, they shouldered the burden of establishing
relationship with critical personnel in the circle of influence.
One cannot say how much and when important information concerning
the opportunities for these banks may be leaked from the chats
among the Chinese officials.
Though the cost of maintaining a representative office is
very high (see page 12) and the latter cannot involve in profit--
making activities, banks are eager to set up their presence in
China because it is deemed a necessary step to enter the China
market. For example when'a manufacturer in some part of the
world deems it oossible and profitable to set up a joint venture
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in China, he may first consult his banker. If his bank has a
representative office in say, Beijing, then the task of finding
relevant information and potential partners for this client can
be delegated to the representative officers.
What will happen if this manufacturer's bank does not have
any form of access to this market? The answer is straight
forward. The client will shift the business to other banks. It
is partly because of this reason that major banks of the world
are so eager to open up their representative offices in China.
The usual locations of these representative offices are
Beijing, Shanghai, Guongchou and Shenzhen. These are the main
testing and battle grounds in the new economic development.
Setting up a representative office is only the first step in
maintaining or starting up a business relationship. A well
connected network built up thereof and the access to information
are very significant.
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Direct Commercial Banking Activities- A Full branch
On April 2, 1985 the State Council of China has issued the
full regulations governing foreign banks and joint Chinese-
foreign banks in the special economic zones (please see Appendix
Five). Article six lay out the activities that branches of
foreign branches can conduct. Banks can apply for the engagement
in part or all of these operations. They are:
1. Granting loans in local and foreign currencies and
discounting bills;
2. Inward remittances from foreign countries and the Hong Kong
and Macao regions, and foreign exchange collections;
3. Settlement of export transactions and outward documentary
bills;
4. Exchange in foreign currencies and foreign currency bills;
5. Local and foreign currency investments;
6. Local and foreign currency guarantees;
7. Buying and selling of stocks and securities;
8. Trust, safe deposit box, credit investigation and consulta-
tion services;
9. Outward remittances by overseas Chinese enterprises, foreign
enterprises, Chinese-foreign joint ventures and Chinese-
foreign co-operative enterprises, settlement of import
transactions and inward documentary bills;
10. Local and foreign currency deposits and overdrafts by
overseas chinese enterprises, foreign enterprises, Chinese-
foreign joint ventures and Chinese-foreign co-operative
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enterprises and local and foreign currency deposits and
overdrafts by foreign nationals, overseas Chinese and
Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao
11. Handling foreign exchange depposits and loans in foreign
countries and the Hong Kong and Macao regions and
12. Other business operations not specified in the regulations
are subject to negotiation.
The scope of business granted certainly is larger than that
which was granted to the four foreign branches in Shanghai
earlier on. The opening up of the speical economic zones to the
foreign banks is a much desired good news although the pace of
this liberation will depend on the results gained in the test
ground- Shenzhen.
At this infant stage it is very hard to ascertain the volume
of business for these foreign branches. The competitiveness of
the local banks like Bank of China, People's Bank of China
people's confidence in foreign banks the pace of development in
the country and the profitability in the operations will
determine how deep the foreign banks will dip in the market.
Nevertheless, bankers are optimistic about the prospect.
20CHAPTER FOUR
MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS OPERATING OUTSIDE CHINA
After laying out the opportunities which need a bank's
direct presence in.the country, this chapter will concentrate on
finding the other opportunities which a bank can exploit without
actually entering into China. Namely, these opportunities
include trade financing, project financing, equipment leasing,
loan syndication, merchant banking and insurance.
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Trade Financing- The Pr n na 1nnnrt-iin i +-xi
Undoubtedly, the impetus to banking activities provided by
the increased volume of trade with China is extremely great.
When we talk about trade financing it is generally necessary to
differentiate the different categories of trade financing. The
procedures and the risks involved are quite different and so are
the opportunities.
The first category is financing by the exporter, which
includes instruments like shipment on an open-book account, time
credits, consignments and collection drafts. The role of the
bank in exporter-financed trade is.solely as a responsible
collector after receiving detailed instructions from the
exporter. Among these financing methods, time credits or known
as deferred payment contracts'is the most popularly used in China
business.
In such kind of arrangement, the foreign seller of the goods
would provide the Chinese buyer with the necessary maturity
period for the purchase. This is actually a short to medium term
credit arrangemnet.
In such transactions banks could participate through
national export credit schemes or served as refinancers. However,
the importance this form of financing gradually subsided because
of the appearance of more competitive instruments.
Financing by the importer is the second category which is
.ess freguent. Methods in this category include payment with
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order, partial payment in advance and payment in documents. In
this category the bank does not have an important role.
However, in the last category- financing by banks, the bank
possess a decisive position. Broadly speaking, finacing
arrangements through banks can be divided into two sub-groups.
They are: 1) Letters of Credit and 2) Arrangements without a
Letter of Credit.
A. Letters of Credit
Internationally, commercial letters of credit or simply
known as letters of credit (L/Cs) is the chief means of financing
for cash transactions. Due to increased number of specific
demands around the world, plenty of variations have evolved.
However, collectively, the use of letters of credit still
predominates.
To alleviate the complexity of documentation and possible
misintrepretation of the variety of documents, the International
Chamber of Commerce has set a worldwide standard called 'Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits' as the governing
rules to settle documentary disputes in international trade.
Although China has not formally accpeted this uniform system, the
practices of the Chinese bankers are in fact similar to what it
prescribes. From what the bankers have said in the interviews,
problem seldom arises due to different methods of documentation
thouqh constant care is necessary.
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The form of L/C required differs in China businesses. It
depends on who the importer is..
When China is the exporter, payment is ordinarily required
t'o be by a confirmed and irrevocable letter of credit. This
letter of credit has to be issued by a bank which has a corres-
pondent relationship with the Bank of China which takes care of
all financial businesses involving foreign countries. This type
of L/C provides the Chinese exporting corporations double
guarantee of payments. It is rare that the Chinese exporters
will accept revocable L/C unless the buyer places an amount of
deposit equivalent to the value of goods sold. Besides, in order
to maximize the use of this short term finance, the Chinese party
often require the additional features of assignability and
divisibility. Moreover, the letter of credit must be payable as
soon as the Chinese present the shipping documents in China to
BOC. Until 1975 payment clauses usually required payment in
Renminbi (RMB), the Chinese national currency. The buyers' banks
had to purchase RMB from the BOC or other Chinese banking
institutions in order to make the purchase. However, within the
last the decade. the Chinese trading corporations are
increasingly willing to conclude contracts based on U.S. dollars
or other desirable foreign currencies such as the Deutsche Mark
and the Japanese Yen, which are required to finance the
modernization
On the other hand, as a buyer, China generally is reluctant
to use an irrevocable, confirmed letter of credit issued by the
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BOC. Payments will not be madeuntil all the documents required
have reached the issuing bank in China.
In a nutshell, China has a higher hand on the many suiters
who want to do business with it. And in fact the credit standing
and the development opportunity in the country are reasons why
China can enjoy such privileges.
Recently, a relatively new instrument has received great
prosperity in the country. This instrument is the 'Back to
Back' letter of credit. This type of credit illustrates the fact
that an exporter has an irrevocable letter of credit in his
favor. He wants to use the instrument as a financing basis for
having a bank (normally the same advising bank) open a similar
irrevocable letter of credit in favor of the ultimate supplier or
manufacturer. The existence of two letters of credit to finance
the same transaction in this manner is called back-to-back
credit. This form of credit is favorable to the Chinese
exporters because the allocation of funds can be more flexible.
However, since the opening of the second credit based solely on
the existence of the first credit, the opening bank may involve
considerable risk in the process.
B. Arranqements Without a Letter of Credit
Typical financial arrangements under this sub-group include
advances on drafts, discounts of the drafts themselves, and
refinancing bills. Permission to provide these facilities in
China is rare and is solely granted only to the four foreign
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branches which were permitted to stay after the Communist
takeover. The scopes in terms of both geographical boundary and
activities allowed are very limited.
On the other hand since the number of foreign banks granted
to do these businesses is limited and the volume of business for
some banks is small in the early stage, many foreign banks resort
to the basic form of international banking- establishing
correspondent banking relationship with the Bank of China which
is the sole Chinese organization to deal with foreign banking
activities. However, since correspondent banking cannot
contribute very much to a bank's competitiveness in the potential
market and the development in China warrants more direct atten-
tion and- investment, it is not necessary to dwell on the
correspondent banking activities here.
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Bank's Role in Countertrade with China
The US Department of Commerce estimates that 20% of the all
world trade is conducted on a countertrade basis (1). The resur-
gence of countertrade is most conspicuous in Asia, though Latin
America is another important area of activities.
Countertrade is primarily designed for those countries with
a shortage of foreign exchange, or a shortage of credit tc
finance their normal flows of trade. In addition, these
countries have a similar goal- to increase their exports or
develop export markets for new products. China, in order to
modernize the country, has to gather sufficient foreign exchange.
Tourism and foreign direct investments are effective means but to
secure a more stable source, China has to develop export markets.
Therefore, countertrade will continue to have a special appeal to
the ChinPcp_
However, what opportunity exists in the countertrade
transactions for the banks? If barter trade and compensation
trade (the most common forms of countertrade) revive, is it
possible that the traders can do without the bankers? Opinions
differ on this subject. Large banks were once induced to
conclude that opportunities were there but the end results proved
that the time and forms of the banks' participation in
countertrade might not be appropriate.
(1) Euromoney, January, 1985, P. 144
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Two reasons accounted for this. Firstly, banks, except for
a handful of large international ones, usually do not have the
worldwide trading networks necessary to dispose the goods
acquired through the transactions. This is a severe drawback on
the banks compared with those large trading houses. Secondly,
banks do not have the capacity to take any position on
commodities, that is, they can go long in dollars or interest
rates, but they do not have the ability to go long in, say,
copper.
In view of this, what will be left to the banks? The
concensus among traders is that they should play the role of
honest broker. They can serve well in bringing the traders
together to arrange the disposals of goods. This role will be
respected by all sides while involvement in actual countertrade
may very likely face conflict of interest and even loss of
business relationship if a corporate customer is in the sari` line of
business.
In addition, the banks still have important function in
documentation and providing traditional banking services like
escrow accounts, letter of credit and guarantees.
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Project Financing- Favourable Prospect
Closely related with trade financing, project financing is
the other area of business which appeals to the international
bankers. In the present stage, China mainly imports foreign
equipment. This equipment is fundamental for the subsequent
stages of industrialization and the numerous projects of
modernization. Most likely, these imports are related to some
types of projects.
Project financing, also known as nonrecourse lending,
originated in the United States in the 1920's. This financing
approach has received increasing attention since its conception.
In brief it has the following characteristics (1):
1. The project is established as a seperate legal entity and
finances a large proportion, generally 65% to 75%, of its
capital requirements with debts.
2. The borrowings are direct obligations of the project and
guarantees provided by the sponsor(s) are limited.
3. Commitments by third parties (suppliers, customers, and
government agencies) provide vital elements of credit
support for the lenders.
4. The project's debt arrangements are engineered to have a
minimum impact on the parents' balance sheet and credit
capacity.
(1) Larry Wynant, 'International Project Financing',
International Finance Handbook, Section 7.3, P.3.
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In brief, the debts in such kind of financial method will be
paid off by the subsequent revenue that is generated by the
project after completion. The-wholesomeness of the deal from the
viewpoint of a private lender such as a commercial bank mainly
hinges on the profitability of the products and services arising
from the projects.
China in general has insufficient infrastructures which are
essential to accommodate the continuously expanding foreign
investments. Roads, railways, airports, communication networks,
etc. are indispensible just as the energy development projects
are. Natural resources such as oil and coal are essential for
the high paced industrialization. On the other hand, more
advanced energy projects such as the Daya Bay Neuclear Plant are
all the same important. Of course, facilities to accommodate the
foreign visitors, tourists and businessmen alike, are urgently
required, too- hotels, for example.
The forementioned types of projects appear to appeal more to
the foreign investors and financers in terms of project
viability. Viability, in brief, is the assurance of a market for
the product and a sufficient return to the project that can meet
the payments. However, projects like agricultural development or
heavy industrial plants are also important to the Chinese and
attractive to some specialized investors.
Usually, the sponsor of a project in China is a joint
venture made up by international investors. In the joint
ventures, the Chinese interest is almost always represented by the
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China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) whose
major duty is to negotiate all China's joint ventures. Like the
.People's Bank of China, the CITIC is directly responsible to the
State Council. Other than this state level CITIC, recently
provincial level 'TIC' organizations also spring up to carry out
the functions in lower levels. The most important of these
smaller scale Chinese equivalent of merchant bank is the Guangdong
Trust and Investment Corporation (GUTIC).
There are quite a lot of considerations a financier has to
undertake in participating in a project. These considerations or
risks are namely technical and construction risks; operating and
market risks; finacial risks management risks; and lastly
political considerations.
Three factors can contribute to the constructions and
technical risks of a project. They are: 1) the physical or
logistical difficulties associated with the location of the
project 2) the type of technology required and 3) the skills
and experience of the sponsors, engineers and contractors.
The second category of risks contains the uncertainties of
the output levels, operating costs and future market prices of the
products. These profit components will determine the
profitability of the project: the sole element of project
viability.
On the other hand, the financial structure of the project
will also seriously affect profits and cash flows of the project.
Four aspects are particularly important: the amount of leverage
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used, the maturity structure of borrowings, the proportion of
fixed- versus floating-rate debts negotiated, and the project's
currency exposure.
The remaining two categories of risks are harder to quantify
than the forementioned ones however, they are equally important.
Undoubtedly, the sponsor's ability to develop and maintain
the projects is critical to the success of the projects.
Otherwise, after the initial phase, profitability will not be
materialized to pay off the debts. Therefore, the sponsor's past
experience with similar projects is very important. Besides, the
importance of the projects to the sponsor is also a determining
factor in success. The sponsor's commitment means a guaranteed
source of support in supplies and investments.
Lastly, political risks must be assessed, especially in
less developed countries where political development is less
stable. The most extreme form of risk to undertake is government
expropriation of the project. Less severe ones like increased tax
and royalties a.nd foreign exchange restrictions have to be
assessed, too.
Assumption of these risks is inevitable in doing project
financing, though the degree may be different within different
countries. In China political risk is undoubtedly the greatest
uncertainty overhanging above the investors and the financiers.
Athough it is generally believed that the extreme forms of
political intervention such as expropriation may not reappear,
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apprehension about the government policy changes is wide spread.
To minimize these risks in ivestment, investors and financiers
would generally select projects which are more important to the
Chinese government and the the latter's equity interest is
substantial. This explain why the investors and financiers are
confident to invest in projects like oilfields development,
energy plants, fertilizer plants or mining projects. It is
because these projects and facilities are important to the
country.
Also, to bypass the foreign exchange obstacle imposed by the
unconvertible nature of the RMB, investors are more willing to
invest in ventures that can guarantee fast return in foreign
exchange. The most prominent example is hotel. Since hotels'
target market is foreign visitors who are going to pay in foreign
currency, the income in foreign currency is certain.
In addition, the management risks in China stands out, too.
Lack of experience in project management is a matter of fact.
Moreover, the management skills in the country may not be
reliable. To overcome this deficiency, it needs the foreign
partners in the joint ventures to transfer the required skills
and technology patiently and conscienciously.
Certainly, a bank cannot afford to ignore the other
categories of risks. They are easier to be quantified and
monitored but any miscalculation on them would be disastrous.
In sum, China will continue to rely on this type of finance
or the modernization programs. Every corner of this huge
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country needs development. Capital will be coming from foreign
investments in the form of joint venture as usual. Banks are
dispensible in provi.ding finance to the investors as well as to




In mid-1981, China Leasing Company, a domestic joint venture
between China International Trust and Investment Corporation and
the State Bureau of Supplies, opened for business. Since then
domestic equipment leasing is in urgent demand. Although, there
are the state-run China Leasing Company and other smaller scale
domestic leasing companies like the Guangdong International
Leasing Company, there are still many opportunities for joint
ventures. For example, in mid-December 1984, three PRC parties
and two foreign ones set up the China International Non-Ferrous
Metal Leasing Company which would import capital equipment from
US and elsewhere, and then lease this equipment to non-ferrous
metals enterprises in China doing mining. The parties are: China
National Non-Ferrous Metals Industry Corporation, Bank of China
and Consultancy Company, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
the First Interstate Bank of California and Banque Nationale de
Paris (1).
Earlier on at January 1984, the Bank of East Asia in Hong
Kong has entered into a joint venture with the Bank of China and
Societe Generale of France to set up the Trilease Company to seek
for the leasing business.
The leasing business in China is still very rudimentary with
hire-purchase-type finance leases the order of the day. A
finance lease is a lease contract in which the lessee receives
(1) Business China, January 10, 1985, p. 8
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title to the equipment after he has paid the lessor the full
cost of it. However, more sophiscated financing is not far off.
With the increased intensity of competition in the market,
operating leases and more complex rental structures will soon
prosper.
Reasons for the Leasing Business to Boom
A few words about the general situations in China may make
it easier to appreciate the reasons why leasing will become more
welcome in China. First of all, Chinese industrial entities have
to go through a tedious procedure applying for foreign exchange
form the central if they want to purchase new equipment from
foreign countries. Secondly, the foreign exchange reserve to the
country. The demand for it is stringent and therefore, it is not
that easy to get allocation.
Under these circumstances, leasing is a viable alternative
for firms in China.
Firstly, firms can get around the tedious application
procedure for foreign exchange simply for buying simple sets of
machines. The amount of time and negotiation saved is very
substantial. Related to this, equipment leasing also enables an
enterprise to obtain the machinery immediately without going
through the complicated and usually prolonged government
approvals required for asset purchases.
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Secondly, leasing can contribute to China's position in
obtaining funds from the supranational organizations such as the
IMF. It is because the latter would not count leasing as part of
the borrower's external indebtedness.
Thirdly, leasing requires less cash for down payments by the
equipment users and it also enable the users to access to inter-
national finacing at a lower cost rather than relying on the Bank
of China in the case of equipment purchase.
To the individual enterprises, leasing also conserves their
access to the allocation of foreign exchange by the central
government as well as minimizes the cash outlay in times of
expansion, without affecting the profit.
Because of the fore-mentioned favourable reasons and plus
the fact that the central government is going to spend about
US$32 billion on equipment acquisition within the coming two
years (1), lease financing will command an important position in
international financiers' consideration. However, several
considerations are warranted before one decide to participate in
the leasing business with China.
Considerations and Risks
In fact, all the complications in doing business with China
more or less arise from the inadaquate legal system in the
(1) Hong Kong Economic Journal, January 7, 1985
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country. The primary important issue is the status of th'e lease.
In the present situation, it is impossible to seperate individual
Chinese enterprise from the state. Should there be any dispute
coming up, it is hard to determine on whom the liability to
perform should fall: the state or the individual enterprise. On
the same line, it is still doubtful whether the leasees can claim
soveriegn immunity in the event of legal proceedings. Since the
leasees do not prossess individual identity apart from being part
of the state, the fear is warranted.
The second thing to beware of is the genuineness of the
authority granted to the Chinese corporations to enter into
leasing agreements. Doing buiness with organizations which have
not applied duely for and ranted the government approval is
dangerous.
So, in sum, the market for equipment leasing is there in the
PRC and the prospect is good, but one has to bear the political
risks when the Chinese laws in this area are inadequate.
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Loan Syndication
Since its modernization policies and economic changes have
taken place, China has already obtained its access to low rate
and long-term finance from supranational organizations like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In addition, the
country has obtained substantial preferential credit lines with a
number of Western governments and Japan.
The cheap funds obtained through these credit sources are
substantial and the country had to take special measures to
deploy these funds. For example, on December 23, 1981 the
Chinese government has set up a Chinese Investment Bank, one of
whose important functions is to act as an intermediate monetary
institution in handling loans from the World Bank.
The World Bank reinstated China's seat in May 1980 and since
then the loans signed worth US$1.9 billion. The World Bank's
president, A. W. Clausen, has predicted that China would be
borrowing around US$1.4 billion from the World Bank this
year (1). This amount equals to 35% of the total debt balance as
at the end of 1984, which was US$4 billion (2).
The relative ease and low cost of borrowings from the
internatinal organizations and sovereign lenders are the sole
reasons for China's lack of interest in the commercial banks.
(1) Asiabanking, Sepetember, 1984 pp. 80-81
(2) Beijing Review, No.6, 1985, p. 16
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China did raise loans from the Euromarket, mainly for US
dollars, but the freguency is low. Moreover, several factors
add to the gloomy outlook of this syndicated loan market. First,
the Chinese are less prone to borrow money and the Chinese
government has all along followed the policy of self subsistence.
If not for the revolutionary economic changes, China would not
have sought for the present credit lines.
Secondly, many countries are eager to please China by giving
her the necessary credit and loans, for the latter has a good
record in loan repayments and more important of all, generous
loans at this stage will mean better ties with the Chinese. A
good relationship is essential for the businesses which are to
come.
So, to conclude, at present the opportunity for large sum
loan syndication in the PRC is relative less attractive than the
other forms of finance. The good credit standing of China among
the international monetary organizations the willingness of
foreign countries to supply low interest soft credits and hard
loans and China's negative inclination to borrow have made
loan syndication not much in want. One has to bet whether there
would be any change among these three factors, which could be
substantial enough to bring round the situation in the near
future. However, it is optimistic that in the long run, China
will need more loans from. the market to support its huge
modernization attempt.
49
Merchant Banking and Insurance- the Latest Challenges
Beyond dispute Japanese banks are the most aggressive banks
in the China market. They are very competitive in their terms of
loans. The rate offered is often lower than the other
competitors. Besides, Japanese banks are willing to take up
greatest risks. For example, they are ready to lend to county
level borrowers which may not be as able as the state level
organizations or the larger Chinese-foreign joint ventures in
obtaining sufficient foreign exchange to repay the loans. To the
other competitors, business with these county level borrowers is
not attractive at all.
This competitiveness of Japan banks is carried over to the
merchant banking activities with China. At present, merchant
banking activities concerning China are rare but still Japan
seems to be able to open up more. The only two of China's
foreign-bond issues since 1949 were conducted in Japan (1) and
the Japanese merchant banks are very successful in soliciting
China's trust. It is said that a large Japanese merchant bank
has been generous enough to train quite a handful of potential
Chinese bankers solely at its own expense.
No doubt opening up this merchant banking market is very
challenging for the foreign merchant banks. However, it will be
very advantageous for a bank to have acquired experience and
dominance at the early stage.of the race.
(1) The Economist, January 5, 1985, p. 69
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On the other hand, by the end of February 1985, eight
insurance companies have applied to the Chinese authority for the
permission to set up business in Shenzhen (1). They consist of
US, Canada and Hong Kong Insurance companies. Their action is a
sign of the revival of the insurance business in China, and the
number of the interested certainly reflects how attractive the
opportunity is.
However, just like the earlier stage of foreign banks entering
into China, these foreign insurance companies will only be
allowed to open representative offices alone, which may not
conduct profit making business. The major function is to build
up relationship. Although there is no clear insurance laws in
China at present, it is very likely that a comprehensive set will
be developed in the near future thus hopefully will allow these
representative offices to be upgraded to branches. Opportunity
is there if hope does not falter.
In short, merchant banking and insurance are two
underdeveloped businesses in China which deserve ambitious
bankers to think about. No tangible immediate reward is
available but to secure long term profit it needs foresights and
early commitment.
(1) Hong Kong Economic Journal, March 11, 1985, p.4
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IMPACT ON BANKS IN HONG KONG
As mina is indergoing her modernization effort, the rest of
the world is feeling the repercussions thereof. People in
different parts of the world are anxious to find out what will
happen to this communist country which contains nearly one-fourth
of the world's population. Politically, success in China's
modernization will alter the pattern of the world power arena and
commercially the impact is even greater. More and more commercial
activities are aimed at tapping the China market and increasing
amount of international corperations are attracted to invest here.
The attraction is no less to the international banks. In the
preceeding sections we have analysed the various opportunities
which are open to foreign banks in China. In this section, the
focus will be on the banks which operate in Honq Kona.
Three reasons explain why the banks in Hong Kong are among
the first to feel the repercussions. Firstly, Hong Kong is
logistically close to the most prosperous special economic zone
in China- Shenzhen. This factor induces abundant investments
from people here and hence these investors have to find suitable
bankers to finance them. Banks located in Hong Kong undoubtedly
out-perform banks in other countries in knowing the local
customers better.
Secondly, Hong Kong has a hard-earned reputation in the
financial world therefore, foreign enterprises who want to set
up business in China will automatically consider what kind of
services and information the Hong Kong bankers can offer them.
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Logically, in order to maintain the present status, the finance
community of Hong Kong, especially the bankers/have to be very
alert on what kind of help they can offer so as to attract the
foreign enterprises.
Lastly, because Hong Kong is one of the important off-shore
banking centres in the world, many international banks have set
up their operations here already. Usually, clients of these
international banks are multinational corporations which are
prone to flex their muscle in new markets like China. Being
client-led, the banks have to pay special attention to the
development of the financial system and investment millieu in
China. Or if the banks are client-leading, they may as well have
to put some effort to monitor the opportunities open to foreign
investors in order to advise their clients better.
Based on these reasons, it is deemed that the impact of
these new opprtunities in China will be substantial on the Hong
Kong banks. The following analysis is based on the information
gathered in the interviews with the experienced bankers with a
view to delineate the types of strategies and transformations
necessitated by the development.
44
Interviews and Results
As mentioned in the first chapter, in-depth interviews are
conducted with bankers who are conversant with the China market.
A full list of these bankers, their positions and the names of
their banks are given in the bibliography. It is believed that in-
depth interviews can solicit more detailed and more in-house
information. Other methods like questionaire survey and
telephone interviews may not have fulfilled the purpose so well.
The major findings are presented here and more systematic
conceptualization will take place in the following sections.
The following table shows the number of representative
offices and branches the interviewed banks operate within China.
Table Three:
Number of Representative Offices and Branches Operated in China
by Interviewed Banks
No. of No. of
Name of Banks Branches Rep Offices
BNP nil 3
Citibank nil 3
East Asia Bank 1 nil
nilFirst Chicago Bank 2
1 4HKSBC
1 3Standard Chartered Bank
The size of the staff in these representative offices is
limited to about four to five officers but the operating staff of
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the branches in Shanghai can be thirty persons strong.
All of these representative offices were set up after 1979,
mostly in 1982 and 1983.
The average size of the China division in the Hong Kong
operation is around five to ten, with the Hong Kong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation's being the largest- 40 persons strong.
Most of the officers in China had to be transferred from
the Hong Kong office and there is a stringent demand for bankers
who are experienced with the China market. As the prospect of
the China market grows, the status of the China office and its
personnel has become more important.
Besides setting up branches and representative offices in
China, all of the interviewed banks maintain correspondent
relationship with the Bank of China.
All of the interviewed banks have entered into some type of
projects with some Chinese authorities and they are also involved
in more than one types of businesses which are not direct
banking, for example leasing and trading. These businesses
either are managed by subsidiaries or joint ventures with other
entities.
Most of the bankers being interviewed had indicated their
greatest strength in the China business in their international
network which can facilitate the introduction of foreign
investments and finding suitable partners.
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On the other hand, they also revealed that the major risk in
the China business came from the inadequate legislative
structure. In addition, the Chinese partners' lack of management
experience and their reluctance to adopt internationally accepted
standard procedures are serious problems, too.
Besides these clearly discernable findings, opinions and
operations of the bankers and their banks vary. They will be
taken care of in the following sections. The main stress is on
the change occurring to the organizational structure of the China
division of the banks because any future strategies and manuovre
will to a great extent depends on organizational flexibility and
the change of the division's status in the organzation will very
much reflect the former's importance and prospect.
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Organizational Structure
As it is mentioned, since Hong Kong is an important offshore
banking centre, many international banks have set up their
operations in Hong Kong. So, as one may ask, is it justified to
treat these Hong Kong branches as individual study units and to
consider impact on these branches rather than on the parent
banks?
The reason is that usually these branches are treated as
seperate profit centres by their headquarters and until China
head offices are set up in China, the China businesses are still
in the domain of the Hong Kong operations. Therefore, branches
of foreign banks in Hong Kong are being studied just like those
banks which have their origin in Hong Kong. This is actually one
the organizational characteristics of the China operation among
the banks interviewed.
Prior to 1979
Prior to 1979 when the outside world was still skeptical
about China's future development, foreign banks with clients
doing business with China only maintained the minimum
link, namely correspondent banking facilities, with the Bank of
China. Only four banks were allowed to maintain their branches
in Shanghai (see page 13). Usually these correspondent banking
activities were subsumed under the operation unit which took care
of correspondent banking for the whole bank. No distinct status
was given to China.
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As for those banks which have branches in Shanghai, the
branch was a special unit of little attention usually taken care
by, say, the area office for Asian countries. The business of these
branches then was small and limited in variety, namely handling
bills and remittances. The number of staff was around 10. In
sum, even though the status was a branch, the scale of operation
did not demanded much greater attention.
From 1979 Till Now
Since 1979, the pace of entering the China market is varied
from bank to bank but it is obvious that nearly all the banks are
attracted by this potential market. For example, Banque
Nationale de Paris was the first one among the banks in Hong Kong
to set up a representative office in Beijing early in 1979 while
the Bank of East Asia which had established a joint venture
leasing company in China still does not have any representative
office in China other than its branch in Shanghai.
Besides that the pace is different from bank to bank, the
pattern of organization is also very varied. It is quite
impossible to distill a general descriptive model. However, two
factors are very important in determining the organization
structure with regard to the China operations.
The first factor is the individual bank's original
philosophy of organizational structure and the second one is the
deqree of optimism within individual banks.
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First of all it is necessary to consider the three
organizational dimensions which shape the organization design of
a bank (1). They are the critical dimensions of product, market
and client. A product orientation relates to specific products or
groups of products provided to customers. Typical product groups
are treasury, capital. market/merchant banking, correspondent
banking/institutional services, export/trade finance and finacial
advisory.
On the other hand, a geographic structure, or market-
oriented structure, focuses on specific geographical regions,
such as Far East, Europe, and so forth. This structure assumes
the transferrability of experience in dealing with markets of the
same region.
Finally, the third dimension is based on the category of
client relationship. This relationship can be related to
specific industry or sectoral groupings or of a generic type-
say, retail or corporate banking.
Different emphasis on different dimensions will result in
different organizational structure but since the promotion by the
large American banks, what is known as the matrix system is very
widespread. This system aims at striking an optimum balance
between a functional/product and geographical orientation.
In fact it is hard to find a bank which employs purely one
approach alone. To a certain extent the management may find
(1) Steven Davis, The Management of International Banks,
MacMillan Publishers Limited, p. 126.
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infusion of some other approach on a partial base a favourable
strategy. The impact of the origin of the bank is not
substantial.
From the interviews it is gathered that almost all the
interviewed banks have a China desk or a China office in the
organization except the Citibank which, by the time of the
interview, has already upgraded the status of the China desk to
that of a seperate entity soley responsible for the China
business, which is known as Citi China.
Due to different organization orientation the status of the
China offices in these banks differs. In most of the banks the
China office in Hong Kong is responsible to the marketing
department while the representative offices in the PRC are
responsible to the international banking division. The function
of the China desk is mainly coordination and consultation. The
China desk does not have a say on decisions concerning the
business conducted in China. Examples of this is the Chartered
Bank and the Banque Nationale de Paris.
On the other hand for banks which are more market oriented,
the China office in Hong Kong will assume more responsibility
and authority. For example, the China division in the Hong Kong
Shanghai Banking Corporation alone has employed more than 40
officers while the other banks usually have a staff of less than
ten. Special research team is also available to foster
development of this market. The operations of the representative
offices and the branch in Shanghai are also under the scrutiny of
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this division. Meanwhile, this China division is within the
scope of the international banking department- a consistent
market oriented organizational structure.
Citibank, a bank well known for its matrix organizational
structure, has adopted similar measures to integrate the
operations concerning the PRC. In order to supervise the
operations of the representative offices in China and embetter
the coordination of resources allocated for the purpose, the bank
has upgraded the China desk in April 1985. Although the staff is
small- only ten officers: including the representative officers,
the Citi China will be an independent entity which takes care of
all the China operations. If the day should come when the
profitability of the China operations and the PRC legal system
warrants the bank to set up its individual headquarters in China,
then Citibank has already completed the first step of creating an
entity ready for this purpose.
Besides the fore-mentioned organizational orientation, how
optimistic the top management of the bank perceives the potential
market to be will also determines the organizational structure of
.its China operations. No doubt, as the years went by since
China's first modernization programmes, foreign countries' faith
in the sincerity and determination of China to reform grew
stronger and stronger. For the bankers, the optimism about the
market accumulates to its height in April when the Chinese
authority finally allows. foreign banks to set up branches in
China. This is the first kind of optimism. Nearly all bankers
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here are optimistic about the future business in China. However,
this general optimism alone cannot influence the strategy very
much. What is more important is the bankers' optimism in their
own banks's capacity in entering the market. For example, if a
bank has already procured a good relationship with the Chinese
authority and a substantial amount of relevant experience, then
its bankers will automatically be more jubilant than their counter-
parts in less competitive banks. Hence, more resources and
attention would be given to this area of great potential.
Similarly, the status the China division enjoys in the
organization would be more substantive.
Looking into the Twenty-First Century
As foreign banks are now allowed to set up branches and
operate substantial amount of business in China, it is foresee-
able that the importance of the China market will continue to
mount. It is also foreseeable that more attention and resources
will be given to the China operations because it takes extra
effort to find out the needs of the new customers and develop
suitable facilities accordingly.
However, since it takes time for China to catch up with the
most up-to-date technology in communication as well as the basic
infrastructures, it is not likely Hong Kong would be striped of
the existing functions of supervising and co-ordinating the
activities inside China. It is possible that banks would set
up country level head offices inside China but these head offices
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would still be dependent on the Hong Kong offices for technology,
experiece and connections with clients.
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Sale Support Services
Due to development of the development of the China market,
the banks in Hong Kong have to provide quite a lot of supporting
services which were not required before. Banks which want to
strengthen the relationship with former customers or obtain new
clients very often have to arrange trade delegations and assist
the clients in negotiations. Needless to say, these banks would
also have to amass great amount of relevant data and information
for their customers.
On the other hand, in order to build up good relationship
within the vast country, these ambitious banks would have to
arrange Chinese officials's delegations to Hong Kong as well.
Recently, some banks have also considered the feasibility of
setting up joint trainning sessions for the potential Chinese
bankers as a rapport to open up more opportunities.
Besides, some of the banks have published special booklets




In a nutshell, the bankers are pleased by the
opportunities open to them in China and are optimistic about the
future development. In general, they are willing to invest quite
a large sum of money in activities which may not bring direct
profit, such as arranging delegations and opening representative
offices. The main objective is to maintain a long term
relationship with the relevant parties, which may be profitable
in the future.
On the other hand, more human resources are being put
into the China operations and in many occasions the status of the
China operation unit is upgraded in the bank. The development of
the China market will continue to solicit attention from the
local bankers but the fear that the resources would be drained
from the Hong Kong operation to the hinterland or some place in
China would take over Hong Kong's financial prowess is not
warranted within the future one or two decades. Moreover, as
China is catching up with the developed world, Hong Kong will




It is not an exaggeration to say that China will become the
most important area of investment globally within the next
decade. The economic revolution in the China has given the
foreign imvestors much confidence. Once the people in China
have tasted the fruits of free economy, it is quite impossible to
force them to return to the old ways. Moreover, only a stronger
economy and a more prosperous state can guarantee that China can
live in peace and independence. Investment opportunities are
abundant and so are the needs for financial facilities.
Besides foreign direct investments, trade activities with
China also demand increasing attention from the bankers. In
brief bankers all over the world are optimistic about the
development.' No bank can afford to ignore the potential profit
that will originate from the activities related to the China
market.
At this stage, trade financing and project financing receive
the greatest attention from the banks. But while China has
recently indicated her willingness to let foreign banks operate
direct commercial banking activites in the country, bankers are
more or less excited by this new prospect.
On the other hand, though the development is much slower and
relevant regulations confusing, equipment leasing, loan
syndication, insurance and merchant banking are areas that banks
may consider to dip into.
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By now, Japanese banks are most competitive and successful
in dealing with the Chinese for their low pricing, geographical
proximity and much longer time of friendly relationship compared
with the western countries. Locally, the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation is the most successful bank which has
allocated more resources to this market than its competitors.
Strategy wise, the banks are willing to sacrifice short term
profitablity for the long term good relationship and market
penetration. They are willing to operate representative offices
and branches in the country though at present the cost is much
greater than the income, if there is any. Also, more attention
is given to the China operation in the banks. More personnel are
being employed and the more important status is bestowed.
In general, the competition for preeminence in this market
will be tough and more and more players will join the game. This
has very important implication for banks in Hong Kong. First, to
those branches of large international banks in Hong Kong, the
China operation will one day become independent from the base in
Hong Kong. This may weaken the importance of the Hong Kong
operations and thus may limit their growth. Secondly, to those
banks incorporated in Hong Kong, the influx of more foreign banks
to China will one day eliminate their competitveness based on
locations and culture. However, this process will take quite a
long time and hopefully by that time Hong Kong will have
embarked on a new track of high quality performance and
excellence.
58
In view of the above facts and findings, what strategy
should a bank adopt to knock on China's door? The author has
identified three very important elements which are essential for
a bank to succeed in the PRC.
Firstly, to maintain an image as a famous international
institution world-wide is nearly indispensable. This image is
built up by the asset size, the management performance, the
client base and the world-wide representation of the bank. To
enter the China market a bank must-emphasize the fore-mentioned
aspects to show that the bank is a famous international bank
which has the resource to maintain and expand its investments in
China.
The second element has special implication for those banks
with capitals contributed by overseas Chinese. This element is
the bank's genuine concern to contribute to the country's
modernization. Usually these overseas Chinese banks may not
possess a world-wide famous image as that of those international
banks such as the Citibank and the Banque Nationale de Paris. To
cover this comparative disadvantage, these banks have to stress
on their devotion to participate in the modernization of the
country. Nationalistic feeling may be important in some
occasions when distrust in foreigners still lingers on among the
decision makers. Moreover, once this special attribute of the
bank is recognised by the Chinese authority the importance of the
first element may command less attention. Therefore, for those
banks which do not have excellent size and reputation they should
try to secure a reputation as a non-profit oriented (at least in
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the short run) bank which has genuine interest in helping the
country to progress. Possible measures include sponsorship of
training programmes for Chinese fincanciers and transmission of
bank management and technoloqy.
The two important elements of success mentioned above are
compementary to each other and so is the last one to them.
Undoubtedly, banking still remains to be a people oriented
industry. The most important asset of a bank is its people-
experienced and capable people. This is true for any area of
businesses in a bank. In order to get a foot-hold in China a
foreign bank must maintain a capable team that is conversant with
the China investment environment as well as the style of doing
things there. At present, bankers generally agree that the major
function of an officer- in China is to establish good
relationship. This is undoubtedly an acceptable tactic but too
much emphasis on this may impress the Chinese that these bankers
are just opportunists. To counter this, representatives with
genuine professional background are necessary. With the
appropriate background, they can more esily identify the needs
there and promote the professional image of the bank.
In brief, the author suggests the banks to reflect on how
successful they are in promoting their image as international
banks in projecting a genuine concern for China's modernization
and deploying knowledgeable and professional bankers in the
market. These three elements are complementary to each other and
banks with different backgrounds may have to find out the
suitable mix in their strategies.
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Appendix One:
List of the 14 Coastal Cities and the Four Special Economic Zones
Special economic zones:
Fujian Province: Shantou, Xiamen
Guangdong Province: Shenzhen, Zhuhai
14 coastal cities:











First National Bank of Chicago yes
British Banks:
Barclays Bank PLC no
Standard Chartered Bank yes
Chinese Banks:
Bank of China no
Nanyang Commercial Bank no
European Banks:
Banque Indosuez no
Banque Nationale de Paris yes
Hnna Kona Ranks:
Bank of East Asia yes
Hong Kong Shanghai Bank yes






Questions Asked In the Interviews
General Background Information:
The origin of the bank
The size of the Hong Kong operation
The history of contacts with China
The reaons for the history
The size of the China operation
The status of the China operation in the bank.
The relationship of the China operation with other Asian operations
The title of the head of the China operation
The title of his immediate supervisor
The organizational chart of this China unit
The time when it was established
The recruitment and selection criteria of the China operation staff
The future operation of this China operation
Specific Questions Related to the Chinese Business:





When were they established
Where are them
Who are the most important partners in China
How were they contacted in the first place
How are the relationship maintained
What are the major difficulties in dealing with these Chinese banks
What are the greatest advantage in having these partners
What sort of learnig experience can be carried over to the future




When were they allowed
What sort of clients do you serve







What are the major duties of the rep officers
What are the usual procedure of each activity and transaction
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What are the major risks in China
political risk
forex risk
How are they evaluated
How are these risks covered
Who evaluate them
How are information about China gathered
What are the most important sources
How are strategies about China determined
Personal Opinions of the Bankers being Interviewed:
What are the potential opportunities you perceive
What are the most prominent external obstacles
What should be China's first concern
What should be the bank's first concern
What are the strengths of the bank in China/
What are the weaknesses
Any internal reorganization envisaged
Who are the most successful foreign banks in China you perceive
Why are they successful
How do you rate your bank in the pursuit of China's business
How is the promotion on this area of activity
How should a bank treat a spoilt child like China
How would you compare China with the others markets over the world
When will China further open up, say upgrading the rep offices
What are the future benefits that justify the present loss in operation
What do you think about the BoC's monopoly in various businesses
What will be the impact on the bank's operation in China if the parent
bank decide to set up competing units
What would say are the major elements in designing the strategies
How would you rate the impact of this change on the bank as the whole
What would you say about the present competition concerning this area









Provisional Regulations for the Establishment of Representative Offices
in china by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Financial Institutuion
(Issued by the People's Bank of China on February 1, 1983)
Article 1
In accordance with the Interim Provision of the State Council of
the People's republic of China for the control of Resident
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises, the following regulations
are formulated with a view to exercising more effective control over the
establishment of representative offices of overseas Chinese and foreign
financial institutions in the People's Republic of China.
Article 2
Any overseas Chinese or foreign financial institution, if it deems
it necessary, may apply for permission to establish a representative
office(s) in Beijing and/or in any of the special economic zones in
China.
After a representative office is set up in Beijing with due
approval, the represented institution may, if necessary, secure further
permission to open subordinate representative office(s) in other
designated cities.
Article 3
Representative offices set up by overseas Chinese and foreign
financial institution in beijing and the special economic zones shall
bear names in immediate conjunction with the description 'representative
office' Such offices set up by overseas Chinese or foreign insurance
companies shall bear names in immediate conjunction with the description
'liaison office' Additional offices set up in other designated cities
shall bear names in immediate conjunction with the description
'subordinate representative office', or 'sub-rep office' for short.
Article 4
Overseas Chinese or foreidgn financial institutions desiring to
establish representative offices and subordinate representative offices
in China shall apply to the People's Bank of China (hereinafter referred
to as the Bank) in conformity with the following procedure:
a. For the purpose of establishing a representative office in
Beijing, the head office of the applying institution shall
address to the governor of the Bank a letter of application
duly signed by the Chairman of the board or the chief
executive of the general management. The application may be
sent direct to the Bank of forwarded through a relevant
Chinese financial institution.
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b. For the purpose of establishing a representative office in a
special economic zone or a subordinate representative office
in other designated cities, the head office of the applying
institution shall address to the governor of the Bank a letter
of application duly signed by the chairman of the board of the
general management. The application may br sent direct to the
Bank or forwarded through the provincial, municipal or
autonomous regional branch of the Bank (hereinafter referred
to as PBC local branch).
C. The applying institution shall submit the following documents
and reference materials:
1. An Application Form for Overseas Chinese or Foreign Financial
Institutions Establishing Representative Offices in the
People's Republic of China, which is obtainable from the Bank,
filled out by the appying institution
2. A photostatic copy of the chartter or business licence granted
by the authorities of the country or region in which the
institution operates
3. Articles of association and by-laws, a anme list of the board
of directors or a similar organization controlling the
institution, the latest balance sheet sheet and statement of
profit and loss of the applying institution
4. Power of attorney given to the chief representative and signed
by the chairman of the board or the chief executive of the
general management and curricula vitae of the chief
representative and other representaitve(s).
Chinese or English translations shall be submitted with the
documents and materials if they are in other lanaguages.
The applying institution shall inform the Bank in writing of
any changes in the submitted documents and materials required
in Points 2 and 3.
Article 5
The overseas Chinese or foreign financial institution, when granted
permission to establish a representative office or subordinate
representative office in china, shall in accordance with the relevant
regulations present the approval certificate to the local
Administration Bureau for, Industry and Commerce and the Public Security
Bureau and go through the formalities for registration and residence.
Article 6
Each of the approved representative offices and subordinate
representative offices of overseas Chinese and foreign financial
institutions shall on the strength of the registration certificateopen
an account with the Bank of China and observe exchange control
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regulations of the People's Bank of China.
Article 7
The representative offices abd subordinate representative offices
are approved by the Bank for a term of three years. If an extension is
desired, the representative shall submit to the Bank thirty days before
the term expires a letter of application signed by the chairman of the
board or the chief executive of the general management. There is no
limit on the number of extensions.
Article 8
The representative offices and subordiante representative set up by
overseas Chinese and foreign institutiuons shall operate within the
scope of non-profit activities such as carrying on business
negotiations, acting as liaison, providing consultancy and other
services. They shall not engage in any direct profit-making business
activities.
The representative offices in a special economic zone shall only
engage in such non-profit activities as mentioned above within the
confines of the special economic zone.
Article 9
Chief representatives, and other representatives, shall be approved
by the Bank before assuming their duties in China. Their total number
shall not be more than
a. four in a representative office in Beijing,
b. three in representative office in a special economic zone, and
c. two in a subordinate representative office in other designated
cities.
In a particular case where more are needed than the prescribed
number, an application shall be sent to the Bank for approval.
Article 10
There is no limit on the number of local Chinese citizens that a
representative office or subordnate representative office may decide to
employ on the recommendation of the local service units for foreigners
or other units designed by the Chinerse government Nor is the Bank's
approval required for such employment.
However, for the purpose of record, a name list of the local
Chinese emlovees
a. of a representative office in Beijing shall be filed with the
Bank and
b. of a representative office in a special economic zone and a
subordinate representative representative office in other
cities shall be filed with the PBC local branch.
Article 11
Reports shall be filed with the Bank for approval in cases
a. where a representative office in Beijing desires to change its
name, address or to replace its chief representative, and
other representative(s) or
b. where a subordinate representative office desires to change
its name or replace its representative(s) or
c. where a representative office in a special economic zone
desires to change its name or replace its chief
representative.
Reports shall be filed with the PBC local branch for approval in
cases
a. where a representative office in a special economic zone
desires to chanae its address or representative(s), or
b. where a subordinate representative office desires to change
its address.
Article 12
When the chief representative of a representative office is absent
from office for a period longer than a month, someone else shall be
designed to assume responsibilities during his absence. A copy of the
designation document shall be sent to the bank for record.
Article 13
Members of representative offices and subordinate representative
offices of overseas Chinese and foreign financial institutions must
observe Chinese laws, decrees, rules and regulations in all their
activities within China and in entering and leaving China.
Article 14
The Bank and its local branches have dthe rights to supervise,
regulate and examine the work of the representative offices and
subordinate representative offices of overseas Chinese and foreign
financial institutions.
Article 15
Each of the representative offices of overseas Chinese and foreign
financial institutions in beijing shall submit to the Bank a report in
Chinese or in english giving a faithful account of its work in China in
the previous year, before the fifteenth of January, every year.
68
Subordinate representative offices in other cities and
representative offices in special economic zones shall file such reports
with the PBC local branches, copies of which shall be sent to the Bank
for record.
Article 16
If an overseas Chinese or foreign financial instiotution decides
to close its representative office or subordinate representative office
in China, it shall notify the Bank in writing thirty days before the
date of closing. After paying off its debts and taxes and clearing off
other obligations, the representative office or subordinate
representative office shall go thriiough the formalities of cancelling
its registration and turning in the certificate at the registration
agency with which it has registered.
The head office of the represented institution shall be held
responsible for any obligations its representative office(s) or
subordinate represntative office(s) leaves unsettled-
Article 17
The bank had its local branches exercise the rights of
examination and penalty in case of violation of these regulations by
representative offices, subordinate representative offices or their
members.
Article 18
The 'Provisional Regulations' comes into force on the date of
issue.
Source: Guidebook on Trading with the People's Republic of China,
United Nations, Second Edition, 1983. pp. 285-288
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Appendix Five:
Businesses Granted to Foreign Branches in Shanghai after the
Relaxation on Banking Activities Announced in late November 1984
1. Exports From China
Documentary Credit Business: The foreign branches are allowed to
advise documentary credits and negotiate and discount bills under
them, both within Shanghai and direct to beneficiaries outside
Shanghai.
Collections: They are also empowered to handle export bills on a
collection basis.
2. Imports into China
The foreign branches may open import documentary credits on behalf
of foreign companies registered in China, Hong Kong and Macau,
companies registered in China and Chinese-foreign joint ventures
(hereinafter referred to as the enterprises) based throughout
China. Shanghai branches are also allowed to handle inward
documentary collections drawn on any organization in china
3. Current Accounts and Time Deposits
US dollar and deposit accounts may be opened for the above-
mentioned enterprises. Accounts in other currencies will also be
considered.
4. Lending
The foreign branches are able to receive inward remittances
expressed in most major currencies for beneficiaries of RMB located
outside Shanghai. Payments for beneficiaries of RMB located outside
Shanghai are possible. Payments in foreign currency made by cable
to beneficiaries outside Shanghai are possible provided the
remitter pays Shanghai commission charges. Demand drafts favouring
beneficiaries anywhere in China may be drawn on Shanghai offices.
The foreign branches may also remit out of China daily business
expenses for the above-mentioned enterprises from foreign exchange
accounts, and in due course will be able, subject to foreign




The foreign branches may issue all forms of guarantees both in
favour of the various state organizations anywhere in China on
behalf of the foreign parties and, at the request of the state
organizations, joint ventures or foreign companies, may issue
guarantee in favour of the beneficiaries outside China on their
behalf.
6. Travellers Chaques
The branches can also encash and issue travellers cheques if, paid
for in foreign currency and conforming with exchange control
regulations.
7, Trade and Credit Information Services
These branches can supply TCI services for Chinese and foreign
corporations as well as for joint ventures.




Regulations Governing Foreign Banks and Joint Chinese Foreign Banks in
Special Economic Zones of the People's Republic of China
(Promulgated by the State Council on April. 2, 1985)
Article 1
These Regulations are formulated with a view to expanding
international economic and financial co-operation so as to conduce to
the bringing in of foreign capital and technology.to promote the growth
of the special economic zones.
Article 2
In these Regulations, 'foreign banks' means the branches set up in
the special economic zones by banks the head offices of which are
located in foreign countries or the Hongkong and Macao regions and which
have been registered in accordance with local laws, and also banks with
foreign capital the head offices of which are located in the special
economic zones and which have been registered in accordance with the
laws of the People's Republic of China.
In these Regulations, 'joint Chinese-foreign banks' means banks
operated in the special economic zones by banks or financial
institutions with foreign capital jointly with banks or financial
institutions with Chinese capital.
Article 3
Foreign and joint Chinese-foreign banks shall abide by the laws and
regulations of the People's Republic of China their legitimate business
operations and legal rights shall be protected by the laws of the
People's Republic of China.
Article 4
For the establishment of a foreign or joint Chinese-foreign bank in
,a special economic zone, an application shall be filed with the People's
Bank of China, which shall examine and consider the application in the
light of the needs of the economic growth of the special economic zone
concerned and on the principle of equality and mutual benefit.
The branches of the People's Bank of China in the special economic
zones shall exercise control and supervision over the foreign and joint-
Chinese-foreign banks.
The State Administration of Exchange Control issues licences for
foreign exchange operations to foreign and joint Chinese-foreign banks.
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Article 5
An application for the establishment of a foreign and joint
Chinese-foreign bank shall be made in accordance with the following
provisions:
(I) A bank with foreign capital that wishes to set up abranch in a
special economic zone shall file an application through its head
office and furnish the following documents and data:
1. A written application signed by the chairman or general manager
of the bank with the authorization of its board of directors
and certified by a notary public, embodying the name of the
branch to be set up, the amount of operating funds allocated to
it by the head office, a brief personal history and a letter
of authorization in regard to each of the, chief responsible
officers and the kinds of business applied for
2. Articles of association, alist of the members of the board of
directors, and the balance sheets, profit and loss statements
and business reports for the three years preceding the
application
3. A copy of the business licence issued by the competent
authorities of the country or region where the bank is located
and
4. A written guarantee from its head office committing to be
responsible for taxes and liabilities.
(II) An application for the establishment of the head office of a
foreign bank in a special economic zone shall be filed by the
foreign investors, along with the following documents and data:
1. A written application for the establishment of a foreign bank
which shall include the name of the head office to be set up,
registered capital abd paid-in capital, alist of the chief
responsible officers and the kinds of business applied for
2. Articles of association
3. A list of the chairman, vice-chairman and members of the board
of directors nominated by the investors and
4. A statement of the investors' assets and liabilities, along
with a certification of a notary public.
(III)An application for the establishment of a joint Chinese-foreign
bank in a special economic zone shall be filed jointly by the
investing parties, along with the following documents and data:
A written application for the establishment of the joint bank,
including the name of the joint bank to be set up, the names of
the joint parties, registered capital and paid-in capital, the
proportions of equity capital contributed by the joint parties,
1.
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and liquidation of foreign enterprises and Chinese-foreign joint
ventures, and after the satisfaction of all taxes and liabilities, the
funds of the foreign bank or the funds owned by or distributed to
overseas investors of the joint Chinese-foreign bank may be remitted
abroad
After liquidation, the foreign or joint Chinese-foreign bank
mentioned in the previous section shall approach the department that
originally issued the registration certificate to have its registration
cancelled.
Article 16
The branchesof the People's Bank of China in the special economic
zones are empowered to issue a warning or impose a fine on any foreign
or joint Chinese-foreign bank acting in contravention of these
Regulations according to the seriousness of each case if there is
objection to the measure meted out, an appeal may be made to the
People's Bank of China for its decision.
In partcularly serious cases, the foreign or joint Chinese-foreign
bank may be ordered to stop its business operations or even to dissolve
its institution.
Article 17
These Regulations shall also apply to banks or financial
institutions with overseas Chinese capital, Hong Kong capital or Macao
capital.
Article 18
The People's Bank of China shall be responsible for the interpre-
tation of these Regulations.
Article 19
The implementation of these Regulations shall commence on the date
of their promulgation.
Source: China Daily, April 17 1985, p. 2
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Article 11
A foreign or joint Chinese-foreign bank shall submit to the branch
of the Peole's Bank of China in the special econoimic zone concerned the
following business reports:
1. A balance sheet as at the end of the previous month, to be
submitted before the tenth of each month
2. An analytical statement of deposit and loans, an analytical
statement of outward and inward remittances and settlement of
import and export transactions, and an analytical statement of
investment items for the previous quarter and
3. the balance sheet, profit and loss statement, and statement of
the balances of accounting items for th eprevious year, along
with an audit report by an accountant registered in the
People's Republic of China, to be submitted before the end of
March of Aarh vrr_
Article 13
The branches of the People's Bank of China in the special economic
zones shall have the right to examine the business and financial
conditions of foreign and joint Chinese-foredign banks, request them to
submit or furnish the related information and data, and send officers to
examine their books, records, etc.
Article 14
The profit that a branch of a foreign bank makes after paying
taxes in accordance with the law may be remitted abroad.
For the profit that a foreign bank head office of a joint Chinese-
foreign bank in a special economic zone makes after deduction for taxes,
the reserve fund, workers' bonuses, welfare fund and enterprise
development fund in accordance with the pertinent regulations, the
portion distributed to investors outside China may be remitted abroad.
The foreign staff and workers and the Hongkong and Macao staff and
workers of a foreign and joint Chinese-foreign bank may remit abroad
their wages, salaries and other legitimate earnings after paying taxes
in accordance with the law.
Article 15
A foreign or joint Chinese-foreign bank that intends to terminate
its business operations shall submit a written report for approval to
the People's Bank of China 30 days prior to their termination.
A foreign or joint Chinese-foreidgn bank that winds up business in
accordance with the law shall be liquidated under the supervision of the
branch of the People's Bank of China in the special economic zone
concerned and other competent authorities in accordance with the
regulations of the Peole's Republic of China governing the dissolution
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compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao
11. Handling foreign exchange deposits and loans in foreign
countries and the Hong Kong and Macao regions and
12. Other business operations.
Article 7
A foreign bank head office or ajoint Chinese-foreign bank in a
special economic zone shall have a registered capital in foreign
excahnge no less than the equivalent of Renminbi 80 million Yuan and a
paid-in capital no less than 50% of the registered capital and the
branch office of a foreign bank in a special economic zone shall hold
operating funds allocated to it by its head office in an amount of
foreign exchange no less than the equivalent of Renminbi 40 million
Yuan.
The paid-in capital or the operating funds of a foreign or joint
Chinese-foreign bank shall be fully in hand within 30 days from the date
its establishment is approved, and this shall be certified by an
accountant registered in the People's republic of China.
Article 8
A foreign and joint Chinese-foreign bank shall, within 30 days from
the date of its being approved, register with the Administration for
Industry and Commerce and obtain from it a business licence it shall
also register with the local tax autorities for tax purposes within 30
days from the date of its operation.
Where a foreign or joint Chinese-foreign bank fails to open business
within twelve months after the date of tis being approved, the original
certificate of approval shall automatically become null and void.
Article 9
The loans granted by a foreign bank head office or a joint Chinese-
foreign bank in a special economic zone to any enterprise in the same
zone shall not exceed 30% of the aggregate of the bank's paid-in capital
and reserve funds and its total investment in the special economic zone
shall not exceed 30% of the aggregate of its paid-in capital and reserve
funds.
Article 10
The exchange and settlement between the local currency and foreign
currencies by a foreign and joint Chinese-foreign bank shall be effected
in accordance with the exchange rates quoted by the State Administration
of Exchange Control and in pursuance of the pertinent regulations.
The interest rates applied by a foreign and joint Chinese-foreign
bank to local or foreign currency deposits, loans, overdrafts and bill
discounts within a special economic zone shall be fixed by reference to
those prescribed by the branch of the People's Bank of China in the same
zone-
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a list of the chief responisble officers nominated, and the
kinds of the business applied for
2. A feasibility report jointly prepared by the joint parties
3. The drafts of the agreement, contract and articles of
association relating of the joint parties and
4. A list of the chairman, vice-chairman and members of the board
of directors of the joint bank nominated by the joint parties.
(IV) Foreign and joint Chinese-foreign banks in a special economic zone
that intend to set up additional branches within the same zone
shall apply to the branch of the People's Bank of China in the same
zone for approval.
A Chinese version shall be attached where the documents and data
indicated in section (I) of this article are in a foreign language.
Article 6
Basing on an application submitted, the People's Bank of China may
grant its approval to foreign and joint Chinese-foreign banks to engage
in part or all of the following business operations:
1. Granting loans in local-and foreign currencies and discounting
bills
2. Inward remittances from foreign countries and the Hong Kong and
Macao regions, and foreign exchange collections
3. Settlement of export transactions and outward documentary
bills
4. Exchange in foreign currencies and foreign currency bills
5. Local and foreign currency investments
6. Local and foreign currency guarantees
7. Buying and selling of stocks and securities
8. Trust, safe depositbox, credit investigation and consultation
services
9. Outward remittances by Overseas Chinese enterprises, foreign
enterprises, Chinese-foreign joint ventures and Chinese-foreign
co-operative enterprises, settlement of import transactions and
inward documentary bills
10. Local and foreign currency deposits and overdrafts by overseas
Chinese enterprises, foreign enterprises, Chinese Chinese-
foreign joint ventures and Chinese-foreign co-operative
enterprises and local and foreign currency deposits and
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